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Abstract
We consider an all-pay auction between several firms under asymmetric
information in which each firm owns a share in its rival. We characterize
the equilibrium and show how much these cross-shareholdings serve to
dampen competition. Additionally, we explain why the well known rela-
tionship between the equilibrium strategies of the standard first price and
all-pay auctions breaks down in our setting.
JEL: D44
1 Introduction
Share crossholdings change firms’ competitive incentives. This has been ob-
served early on in the context of Cournot competition by Reynolds and Snapp
(1986). The implications of crossholdings of shares have been analysed in the
context of winner-pay auctions by Dasgupta and Tsui (2004) and Greenlee and
Waehrer (2004). A further mode of competition occurs in beauty contests and
lobbying games in which all competitors pay their bids. The analysis here is the
first to study the role of share crossholdings for all-pay auctions in a framework
with incomplete information. We focus on symmetric independent valuations,
and compare bidding behaviour in the all-pay auction with the corresponding
standard (winner-pay) first-price auction.
2 The all-pay auction
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There are N = {1, 2, ...n} firms who each draw their valuation of winning the
all-pay auction independently from a continuous, strictly increasing cumulative
distribution function F (v) with density f(v). The support is [0, v]. The actual
draw is private information. Firms make bids xi and the firm with the highest
bid is awarded the prize. With multiple highest bids, the prize is randomly
allocated among the firms making the highest bid. All firms must pay their
bids in full, irrespective of who wins the prize.
Each firm’s operating profit equals the probability of winning the auction
times the firm’s valuation vi minus the firm’s bid xi. Firms maximize their
operating profits in the absence of cross-holdings. Cross-holdings change firms’
objective functions. As shown by Greenlee and Waehrer (2004), the reduced
form of their objective functions becomes a weighted sum of all firms’ operating
profits, with weights being functions of the crossholdings of shares.
With n firms there are many cross-ownership constellations. In order to
derive analytical solutions we adopt the notion of semi-symmetry of Greenlee
and Waehrer. Let θii be the weight that firm i attributes to its own operating
profit, and θij be the corresponding weight by which the operating profit of firm
j enters into firm i’s objective function. Define the average weight i attributes to
the other firms’ operating profits as θi = 1n−1
P
j∈N\{i} θij . Ownership shares
are semi-symmetric if for all i, j ∈ N , θii = θjj and θi = θj . We assume that
a firm cares more about its own operating profits than about those of rivals so
that θii > θi for all i.
Let g(v) = x be a monotonically increasing, differentiable bidding strategy;
its inverse is given by g−1(x) = v. Denote by Fn−1(t) the distribution of the
highest valuation among i0s opponents, and by fn−1(t) its density. Suppose
further that all players other than i have adopted this strategy, and consider
the objective function of firm i with valuation v and bid/effort x.











The first component in (1) is the weighted expected operating profit. It
wins if it beats all (n− 1) opponents with value-bid pair (v, x), and the second
is the weighted average share in the other firms’ expected prize value if one
of these should win (given that i does not know the other’s exact valuation).
The third term represents i0s share of the bid costs of the competitors through
cross-ownership.











Writing g−1(x) = v by definition and noting that g−1
0
(x) = 1g0(g−1(x))means










which must equal zero at an optimum. Setting ∂πi(v,x)∂x = 0 and rearranging
gives
g0(v) = vfn−1(v)(αv + (1− α)g(v)) (4)
where α ≡ 1− θiθii . Note that the equilibrium is homogenous of degree zero in
θi and θii; hence the symmetry of the model is a restriction on the composition
of ownership (in own firm versus cross ownership), not a restriction on individual





where K is a constant of integration which equals zero since g(0) = 0. In-
tegrating the right-hand-side of (5) by parts gives the bidding strategy in the









When θi = 0, then α = 1 and the bid strategy is of course the same as in
the regular all-pay auction under asymmetric information. Notice that as θi
increases then the bid of each player is reduced to a fraction of its level in the
absence of cross-shareholdings. Hence the expected revenue from the all-pay
auction is a fraction α(θi) of its level without cross-shareholdings.
3 The standard first-price auction
In the all-pay auction, the cross-shareholding simply reduces the size of the bid
by a factor α(θi), but in the standard (winner-pay) first-price auction this has
a more fundamental effect on the equilibrium bid strategies. Writing b(v) as
the symmetric bid function and taking equilibrium behaviour of other firms as
given, the objective function of firm i in the standard first-price auction can be
written
πfpi (v, x) = θii
Z b−1(x)
0








= (θii − θi)(v − b(v))
fn−1(v)
b0(v)
− θiiFn−1(v) = 0 (8)
can be rearranged to yield the first order differential equation
b0(v) = α(v − b(v)) fn−1(v)
Fn−1(v)
Thus the equilibrium strategy b(v) in the n-player standard first-price auc-
tion with cross-shareholding (and a reserve price of zero) is








a result first demonstrated by Greenlee and Waehrer (2004). One can see that
when θi = 0 (i.e. α = 1) we have the usual relationship that g(v) = F (v)n−1b(v),
i.e. the bid in the all-pay auction is the same as the expected payment by type v
in the standard first-price auction. When θi approaches θii, that is α approaches
zero, equilibrium bids converge to zero in the standard first-price auction as in
the all-pay auction. The case α equal to zero implies that the interests of all
players are aligned in the sense that they have a common interest in allocating
the object to the bidder with the highest valuation. With interests being fully
aligned, the game reduces to a pure coordination game, with a separating equi-
librium in a small interval at zero. Due to separation the object is allocated to
the firm with the highest valuation.
Furthermore, b(v) is strictly concave in α. Since F (v)n−1b(v) equals g(v)
when α equals zero and one, and g(v)increases linearly in α, it follows that
F (v)n−1b(v) strictly exceeds g(v) for all α except at the boundaries. Hence,




F (t)n−1b(t)f(t)dt strictly exceeds the expected revenue per player




To provide intuition on the more aggressive bidding behavior in the first
price auction, consider the effect of a change in cross ownership on the marginal
benefit of bidding. Differentiating the two first order conditions (3) and (8) with








= −[v − b(v)]fn−1(v)
b0(v)
Here fn−1(v)/g0(v) is the increase in win probability associated with a higher
bid. In the all-pay auction, where firms pay their bids unconditionally, the total
effect on revenue flows from ownership shares in rival firms is proportional to
gross value v. In the standard first-price auction, however, competing firms
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carry no bidding costs in case the firm wins the auction. Thus, the effect on
revenue flows is proportional to net value v−b(v). In other words, by increasing
the bid in the standard first-price auction, a firm reduces its expected external
bidding cost, which is a relevant saving. This effect has no correspondence in
the all-pay auction, and explains the more aggressive bidding that occurs in the
standard first-price auction.
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